Towards a uniform analysis of any by Robert van Rooij
Abstract In this paper, Universal any and Negative Polarity Item any are
uniformly analyzed as ‘counterfactual’ donkey sentences (in disguise). Their
difference in meaning is reduced here to the distinction between strong and weak
readings of donkey sentences. It is shown that this explains the universal and
existential character of Universal- and NPI-any, respectively, and the positive and
negative contexts in which they are licensed. Our uniform analysis extends to the
use of any in command and permission sentences. It predicts that whereas the use of
any in permission sentences is licensed and gives rise to a universal reading, it is not
licensed in command sentences.
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1 Introduction
The word ‘any’ is one of the most discussed items in theories of natural language
form and interpretation. What does the word mean, and why can it be used
appropriately, or even grammatically, only in a very limited set of grammatical
contexts? Even more challenging, perhaps, is the question whether we can give a
‘uniform’ enough analysis of U(niversal) any, N(egative) P(olarity) I(tem) any, and
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F(ree) C(hoice) any1 that can account for their differences in meaning, but still
explains why these different meanings are expressed (at least in English) by the
same word. In this paper I will argue in favor of an analysis of all these uses of any
as ‘counterfactual’ donkey sentences (in disguise).2 The difference between U-any
and NPI-any will be reduced to the distinction between strong and weak readings
of donkey sentences. I will show that this explains the universal and existential
character of U- and NPI-any, respectively, and the positive and negative contexts in
which they are licensed. FC-any will be analyzed like NPI-any and its universal
force will be accounted for in terms of a new performative analysis of permission
sentences.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, I will motivate and explain
Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) widening and strengthening analysis of any. In
Sect. 3 I will explain van Rooij’s (2006a) analysis of (strong readings of) coun-
terfactual donkey sentences, and in Sect. 4 I will analyze Universal any in terms of
it. Section 5 will deal with NPI-any. It will be shown that if we treat this item as a
weak ‘counterfactual’ donkey sentence, the meaning of NPI-any will turn out to be
equivalent to a standard indefinite, but one that can be used appropriately (via
Kadmon and Landman’s licensing conditions) almost only in negative contexts. In
Sect. 6 I discuss the use of any in permission sentences and explain why FC-any is
licensed in permissions, but not in commands. I conclude in Sect. 7 with briefly
comparing my proposal with some others.
2 The widening analysis of any
Ladusaw (1979) proposed a very successful semantic characterization of the
contexts in which any can be used appropriately: as far as any is a negative
polarity item it can be used appropriately, or is licensed, only in downward
entailing contexts. Context X  Y is downward entailing (DE) iff from the truth
of XaY and the fact that ½½b  ½½a (where ½½a denotes the semantic meaning of
expression a) we can conclude the truth of XbY . Thus, a context is DE iff an
expression occurring in it can be replaced by a semantically stronger expression
salva veritate.
Although Ladusaw’s characterization of the contexts in which any can occur
appropriately is quite successful, his proposal can’t be the whole story. First, any
sometimes has a ‘universal’ reading, and if it does, it can occur in a non-DE context.
1 U-any is normally identified with FC-any. As will become clear in the rest of this paper, I believe there
is good reason to separate them.
2 It will turn out that my analysis of the various uses of any does not always crucially involve coun-
terfactual worlds. For this reason, a reviewer suggested to change terminology. I see the force of this
suggestion, but I have decided to keep on using the phrase ‘counterfactual’, though now making use of
quotation marks. The reasons for this are two: first, the standard ordering relation used to represent the
meaning of counterfactual conditionals plays a crucial role in my analysis; second, I want to make clear
that the proposal is built on my earlier analysis of counterfactual donkey sentences (van Rooij 2006a).
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(1) a. Any owl hunts mice.
b. Any farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
c. John talked to any woman who came up to him.
Second, although the DE analysis might give a reasonably good description of
the contexts that license NPI-any, it does not explain why they do so and it takes the
meaning of the item itself to be irrelevant.
Kadmon and Landman (1993) (henceforth K&L) account for these problems by
taking the meaning of any into account.3 They argue that an NP of the form any CN
should be interpreted like the corresponding indefinite a CN, but where the domain of
quantification over which the indefinite with any ranges is wider than the domain of a
CN, and where the sole difference between NPI-any and U-any lies in the fact that the
latter, but not the former, is interpreted generically. Moreover, K&L propose an
explanation for why NPI-any is licensed only in DE contexts. This proposal involves a
second meaning contribution of any: the interpretation of the sentence after domain
widening has to be stronger than before widening. Consider (2a) versus (2b):
(2) a. *John ate anything. 9xAteðj; xÞ
b. John didn’t eat anything. :9xAteðj; xÞ
Sentence (2a) is unacceptable, but its negation (2b) is not. Because extension of the
domain over which (kind of) things John might eat would make ‘John ate some-
thing’ only weaker, i.e. less informative, (2a) is correctly predicted to be unac-
ceptable. Sentence (2b), on the other hand, gets a stronger, more informative,
interpretation after domain widening, and is thus predicted to be acceptable. Thus,
the licensing of NPI-any in DE contexts does not have to be stipulated, but falls out
as a ‘theorem’ of their analysis.
K&L’s widening analysis of any is attractive and seems to be just what we need
for NPI-any.4 As noted by Dayal (1998), however, the proposal is more problematic
for U-any. Recall that K&L propose that any should have the same meaning as the
corresponding indefinite, and gets a universal interpretation in positive contexts just
in case the corresponding indefinite is read generically. Dayal notes that this is not
quite right: whereas (1c) clearly has a universal interpretation, the same sentence
with the corresponding indefinite, i.e. (3), does not have a generic reading.
(3) John talked to a woman who came up to him.
Moreover, while generics allow for exceptions, sentences with U-any don’t. This
strongly suggests that U-any should not be thought of as being a standard indefinite
3 Krifka (1995) develops a very similar approach independently. Both approaches seek to solve other
problems of Ladusaw’s analysis as well, but we won’t bother about that in this paper. In this paper I use
K&L’s analysis, although I believe that Krifka’s analysis would do equally well.
4 K&L also shows that the widening + strengthening account can explain the licensing of NPI-any in
some other contexts than just the DE-ones. Krifka (1995) and van Rooij (2003) show that it can explain
the licensing of NPIs in questions, while Heim (1984) and van Rooij (2006a) show (in different ways) that
it accounts for the occurrence of any in antecedents of counterfactual conditionals as well.
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that receives a generic interpretation. But this gives rise to the question how, then, to
account for the universal readings of any in (1a)–(1c)? Dayal (1998) suggests to
give up on K&L’s uniform analysis of any and proposes that in contrast to NPI-any,
U-any denotes a universal quantifier. However, to account for the fact that (4a) has
an additional ‘that-can’t-be-an-accident’-interpetation not shared by (4b), she claims
that U-any is a special kind of quantifier: it quantifies over possible rather than
actual individuals.
(4) a. Any student in Mary’s class is working on NPIs.
b. Every student in Mary’s class is working on NPIs.
The intuitions Dayal wants to account for are real, but one wonders whether we
really have to give up on a uniform analysis of any. We here propose that this is not
needed if we analyze both any’s as ‘counterfactual’ donkeys (in disguise).5
3 Counterfactual donkey sentences
3.1 Counterfactuals
Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) gave the following well-known analysis of
(counterfactual) conditional sentences represented by / > w:
/ > w is true at w if some / ^ w-worlds are closer to w than any / ^ :w-
worlds.
The notion ‘closer /-world tow than’ can be explained in terms of an ordering relation
on the accessible worlds (but let us assume that all worlds are accessible). The ordering
relation ‘w’ between worlds is required to obey the following conditions: reflexivity,
transitivity, connectedness, and strong centering.6 The intuitive meaning of v w u is
that v is at least as close, or similar, to w as u is. Accepting the limit assumption, i.e.,
½½/ 6¼ ; ) fv 2 ½½/ : 8u 2 ½½/ : v w ug 6¼ ; (or limiting our analysis to the finite
case), we can reformulate the semantics of counterfactuals in terms of a selection
function. Let us define a selection function f in terms of the similarity relation as
follows: fwð½½/Þ ¼ fv 2 ½½/j 8u 2 ½½/ : v w ug. The proposition expressed by the
conditional / > w is now the following set of possible worlds:
½½/ > w def¼¼ fw 2 W : fwð½½/Þ  ½½wg
That is, / > w is true in w iff w is true at every closest /-world to w.7
5 For a discussion of other proposals, see Sect. 7.
6 Reflexive: for all v : v w v. Transitive: for all v; u and x: if v w u and u w x, then v w x. Con-
nected: for all v and u, v w u or u w v. Strong centering: for all v : w 6¼ v) ðw w v and v 6w wÞ.
7 Of course, Stalnaker’s analysis is still stronger, because he makes the additional assumption that for all
½½/  W and w 2 W , fwð½½/Þ is always a singleton set. In terms of the similarity relation between worlds,
this means that Stalnaker assumes that <w obeys trichotomy: for all u; v : u <w v or v <w u or u ¼ v:
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3.2 Donkey sentences
Lewis and Stalnaker assumed that the meaning of a sentence can be represented
adequately by a set of possible worlds. It is well known, however, that this leads to
problems for the analysis of indefinites and pronouns, especially in donkey sen-
tences. Of course, Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) showed that we could maintain a
uniform analysis of indefinites and pronouns and still get the truth conditions of
donkey sentences right, while Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and others have
demonstrated that such an analysis need not threaten compositionality if we are
willing to change our static possible-world conception of the meaning of a sentence.
According to the alternative dynamic view, we interpret sentences with respect to a
context that is represented by a set of world-assignment pairs, and the meaning of
the sentence itself can be thought of as the update of this context, where possibilities
are eliminated when the sentence is false, and the assignment of the possibilities is
enriched if a new variable, or discourse referent, is introduced by way of an
indefinite.8 According to this analysis, the formula 9x½Px ! Qx is predicted to be
equivalent with 8x½Px ! Qx, which means that we can account for (standard)
donkey sentences in a systematic and compositional way.
3.3 Counterfactual donkeys
In standard indicative donkey sentences it is unproblematic to assume that the
conditional connective should be interpreted as material implication. But donkey
sentences show up not only in indicative mood; we have counterfactual donkey
sentences as well:
(5) If John owned a donkey, he would beat it.
Representing counterfactuals as / > w like before, we would like to represent (5)
abstractly as 9x½Px > Qx, while still maintaining the equivalence with 8x½Px > Qx.
The challenge is to account for this equivalence, without giving up our standard
dynamic account of indefinites. In van Rooij (2006a) it is shown how this challenge
can be met, and I will repeat the argumentation from that paper here.9
Suppose that we want to interpret a sentence of the form 9x/ > w in possibility
hw; gi. According to the standard Lewis/Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals, we
should then select among those possibilities that verify 9x/ the ones that are closest
to hw; gi and check whether they also make w true. Because / might contain free
variables that should be interpreted by means of g, the natural context of inter-
pretation of 9x/ is the set W ðgÞ ¼ fhv; hi : v 2 W & h ¼ gg.10 After the interpre-
tation of 9xPx, for instance, we end up with a set of world-assignment pairs like
8 I assume here that assignments are partial functions.
9 This treatment of counterfactual donkey sentences was crucially inspired by Alonso-Ovalle’s (2005)
analysis of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents.
10 For simplicity we can assume that all worlds have the same domain, but this is quite inessential,
because we could also make use of counterpart functions from individuals and worlds to individuals. It is
implicitly assumed that W denotes the set of all worlds. This need not always be the case, though.
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hv; hi, where variable x is in the domain of assignment h, and hðxÞ is an element of
the set denoted by P in world v. Let us denote this set of world-assignment pairs by
=9xPx=g. To check whether 9x½Px > Qx is true in hw; gi we have to select among
the possibilities in =9xPx=g those that are closest to hw; gi, and see whether they also
verify Qx. But this means that we need an ordering relation, hw;gi, between world-
assignment pairs with respect to possibility hw; gi : hu; ki hw;gi hv; hi. Fortunately,
there is a natural way to define an ordering ‘’ between world-assignment pairs in
terms of the ordering relation between worlds used by Lewis and Stalnaker:11
Definition 1 Given a Lewis/Stalnaker similarity relation w between worlds, we
define the similarity relation hw;gi between world-assignment pairs as follows:
hv; hi hw;gi hu; ki iffdef h ¼ k  g and v w u:
Notice, first, that in case the antecedent / of a counterfactual doesn’t introduce
new variables, or discourse markers, all the elements of =/=g are world-assignment
pairs with assignment g. Thus, in that case ‘’ comes down to ‘’, because we can
now ignore the assignment function. But suppose that / is of the form 9xPx. In that
case, all the assignments in =9xPx=g differ from g in that they also assign an object
to x. Let hv; hi and hu; ki be two possibilities in =9xPx=g. According to definition 1,
to check whether one of these is more similar to hw; gi than the other only makes
sense in case h assigns the same individual to x as k does, hðxÞ ¼ kðxÞ.12 But this
means that we must check for each individual d separately what are the closest
possibilities to hw; gi that make P x true. We define the selection function as fol-
lows:
Definition 2 Given a similarity relation hw;gi between world-assignment pairs as
defined in definition 1 and a standard dynamic update function ½, we define the
selection function f  from sets of world-assignment pairs to sets of world-assign-
ment pairs as follows:





¼¼ ½/ðfhv; hi : v 2 W & h ¼ ggÞ; and j <i k iffdef j i k but not k i j:





hw;giðfhv; g½x=d i : d 2 IvðP ÞgÞ. On our assumption that / > w is true in
hw; gi iff 8hv; hi 2 f hw;gið=/=gÞ : hv; hi verifies w, we end up with the happy result
that 9x½Px > Qx is equivalent with 8x½Px > Qx.13 I conclude that we can account
for counterfactual donkey sentences in a natural and compositional way.
11 The same ordering has been used in Schulz and van Rooij (2006) to account, for instance, for the
intuition that the answer ‘John came, Mary came, or both came’ to the question ‘Who came?’ does not
give rise to an inconsistency, although it should be interpreted in a global exhaustive way.
12 Though the relation ‘w’ is connected, ‘hw;gi’ is not.
13 To be sure, this equivalence holds for many-ary donkey sentences as well: if ~x is an n-ary tuple of
variables and / and w are n-ary predicates, our analysis predicts that 9~x½/ð~xÞ > wð~xÞ is equivalent with
8~x½/ð~xÞ > wð~xÞ.
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4 Universal any as a ‘counterfactual’ donkey
Notice that for 9x½Px > Qx to be true in world w where P has a non-empty
extension it is not enough that all individuals in the extension of P also have
property Q: it must also be the case for all non-P individuals that they would have
property Q if they had property P . Thus, 9x½Px > Qx is stronger than 8x½Px ! Qx.
This last feature suggests that we can account for the extra ‘that-can’t-be-an-
accident’-interpretation of U-any when we think of it as a ‘counterfactual’ donkey
in disguise.
The idea is to translate Dayal’s any in a (dynamic) Montague-style framework
(with connective ‘>’) by ‘kPkQ9x½Px > Qx’.14;15 Notice, first, that on such an
analysis, (1a), Any owl hunts mice, is interpreted as a kind of generic statement,
though without exceptions, and that on this analysis (1b), Any farmer who owns a
donkey beats it, is treated as a standard (though ‘counterfactual’) donkey sen-
tence, without any further problems. Second, on this analysis (4a), Any student
in Mary’s class is working on NPIs, has a stronger meaning than (4b),
Every student in Mary’s class is working on NPIs, because (4a) has the extra
‘that-can’t-be-an-accident’-interpretation.16 Remember that to account for this
effect, we don’t have to quantify over possible individuals.
A problem for any analysis of any is that it should be able to account for the fact
that whereas (6a) is not appropriate, (6b) is:
(6) a. Yesterday, John talked to any woman.
b. Yesterday, John talked to any woman he saw (yesterday).
What has to be explained is how it can be that the extra ‘he saw (yesterday)’ added
to the restrictor of any turns the inappropriate (6a) into the appropriate (6b).
According to Dayal (1998), (6a) is inappropriate because it gives rise to too strong
truth conditions. Her analysis involves the proposal that U-any universally quan-
tifies over possible instead of actual individuals. We don’t quantify over possible
individuals but can still account for the inappropriateness of (6a) by our ‘counter-
factual’ treatment of any: (6a) would be interpreted as saying that ‘for all indi-
viduals, if he/she were a woman, John would have talked to him/her yesterday.’
According to our analysis, this can only be the case if John talked yesterday not only
to all existing women, but also to every non-existing woman, which is an obviously
false claim. For this reason, I propose, (6a) is inappropriate. This is all fine, but why,
14 Our earlier claim that 9x½Px > Qx is equivalent with 8x½Px > Qx was based on the implicit
assumption that every world has the same domain. In case we don’t make that assumption, the equiv-
alence only holds if the universal quantifier quantifies over possible individuals. This shows that our
proposal is indeed close to Dayal’s analysis.
15 Independently, Kim and Kaufman (2006) proposed to treat some Korean Indeterminate-Na items in
terms of a similarity relation between worlds as well. It would be interesting to see how the proposals
relate to each other.
16 The difference between the meaning of any and every disappears, on our analysis, if the restricting
noun of the quantifier is ‘empty’. Thus, Anybody smokes is predicted to mean the same as Everybody
smokes. I take it that the former sentence is less appropriate than the latter, and would like to account for
that by noticing that there is a more standard alternative (the sentence with every) with the same meaning.
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then, is (6b) suddenly appropriate? Dayal (1998) argues that this is due to the
episodic character of the extra ‘he saw (yesterday)’ added to the restrictor. Again,
we will follow Dayal. If we assume that the extra material ‘he saw yesterday’ should
be interpreted in the actual world,17 this means that any in (6b) now quantifies only
over individuals John actually saw (yesterday). As a result, (6b) will be interpreted
as saying that ‘for all individuals John actually saw (yesterday), if he/she were a
woman, John would have talked to him/her yesterday’.18 But then, (6b) becomes a
statement with very modest truth conditions,19 and there is no pragmatic reason
anymore to deem it inappropriate.
In this section we have dismissed K&L’s analysis of U-any as a generic indef-
inite. This doesn’t mean, however, that I would like to give up their constraint on
appropriate use of U-any as well. In fact, adopting their constraint gives rise to an
interesting consequence. Recall that K&L propose that any can be used appropri-
ately only if domain widening results in a stronger assertion. Let us say that 9xD½Px
means that the domain of quantification of ‘9’ is restricted to individuals in D.
Observe now that if D0  D, it immediately follows that 9xD½Px > q is stronger
than 9xD0 ½Px > q. This is so because 9xfd1;d2g½Px > q, for example, comes out as
being equivalent with ðP ðd1 Þ > qÞ ^ ðP ðd2 Þ > qÞ,20 while 9xfd1g½Px > q is equiv-
alent with P ðd1 Þ > q, and is thus weaker. Thus, it is predicted that U-any is
appropriate in positive contexts. If we embed U-any under negation, however,
domain extension leads to a weaker assertion,21 which means that U-any is pre-
dicted to be appropriate only in positive contexts. I believe that this is in accordance
with the facts.22
Let us remind ourselves what we have done in this section: we have accounted
for Dayal’s observations (or at least the ones mentioned in this paper) concerning
U-any without having to give up the popular assumption that all uses of any should
be handled by means of existential quantification. Although U-any is represented in
terms of existential quantification, we still predict a universal reading and—via
K&L’s domain widening and strengthening—that U-any is appropriate only in
positive contexts. The picture that emerges, then, is the following: any should
always be represented in terms of an existential quantifier, and its use is appropriate
just in case domain extension gives rise to a stronger assertion. For NPI-any we
follow K&L and treat it standardly as kPkQ9x½Px ^ Qx, which means that it can be
used appropriately (almost) only in DE contexts. For U-any we proposed the rep-
resention kPkQ9x½Px > Qx, and we have seen that this results in the appropri-
ateness condition that it can be used in positive contexts only.
17 Accounted for either by a two-dimensional actuality operator or by a two-sorted logical language that
allows for quantification over worlds in the object language. See also Chierchia (2006).
18 Thanks to a reviewer for pointing out a problem with an earlier, slightly different proposal.
19 Though it still has a stronger meaning than the universal ‘Yesterday, John talked to every woman he
saw.’
20 Where d is a constant in the language that uniquely denotes d.
21 This is obvious, because :ð9xfd1 ;d2g½Px > qÞ is now equivalent with :ðP ðd1 Þ > qÞ _ :ðPðd2 Þ > qÞ,
which is weaker than :ðP ðd1 Þ > qÞ, which is equivalent with :ð9xfd1g½Px > qÞ.
22 The same prediction is made, of course, by anyone who accounts for U-any in terms of universal
quantification like Dayal (1998, 2004) and Saeboe (2001).
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5 NPI-any as a weak ‘counterfactual’ donkey
Although I find this emerging analysis appealing, it should be clear that we can’t
be fully satisfied yet. First of all—as will be discussed in the final section—other
authors have proposed a conditional analysis of U-any before, and so it is not
clear what is won by our particular treatment making use of the counterfactual
connective ‘>’. Second, the treatment suggested so far of U-any and NPI-any is
not yet uniform enough: the connectives involved in the different uses of any are
different, and we still have to admit that any is ambiguous. Without claiming that
we can get rid of this ambiguity completely, I would like to propose that the
different uses of any are almost identical, if we think of NPI-any from a
‘counterfactual’ donkey perspective as well. I will argue that the U-and NPI-uses
of any are as closely related as the strong and weak readings of ‘counterfactual’
donkey sentences. In this section I will first present the analysis of weak coun-
terfactual donkey sentences given in van Rooij (2006a), and then propose to treat
NPI-any in terms of it.
5.1 Weak counterfactual donkey sentences
Although I believe that a counterfactual donkey sentence is mostly equivalent to a
formula with wide scope universal quantification, there are (at least) two types of
examples where this equivalence seems dubious, or even obviously wrong:
(7) a. If Alex were married to a girl from his class, it would be Sue.
b. If I had a dime in my pocket, I would throw it into the meter.
For (7a) to be true, it doesn’t seem to be required that for any individual (e.g. Mary),
if that individual were from Alex’s class and married to him, it would be Sue. For
this paper the second type of example, i.e (7b), is more interesting. The indicative
version of this example is of course the standard example that shows that not all
donkey sentences give rise to universal readings.
The universal reading of donkey sentences in standard DRT, FCS, and dynamic
semantics depends on the assumption of unselective binding. I made that assump-
tion in Sects. 3 and 4 as well, by defining the ordering relation between world-
assignment pairs as in definition 1. However, this gives rise to the problem of how
we can account for weak readings of donkey sentences (the indicative version of
(7b)) and for asymmetric readings of adverbs of quantification (the proportion
problem). The standard way to solve those problem in dynamic semantics (going
back to Root 1986 and also defended in Dekker 1993) is to give up unselective
binding for all variables involved. The idea is to quantify not over individual
assignments, but rather over equivalence classes of assignment fuctions, and
require that for the donkey sentence to be true there should be an element of each
equivalence class of assignments verifying the antecedent that makes the conse-
quent true. Two different assignments are in the same equivalence class of
assignment functions iff the variables with different values are not being selected
over. The nice thing about this solution is that (i) one still treats all indefinites in the
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same way, and (ii) the indefinite whose introduced variable is not unselectively
bound can still be picked up anaphorically in the consequent.
So, how does this work for counterfactual donkey sentences? Well, we will
represent a counterfactual in general by a formula / >X w, where / and w are as
expected, and X is the set of variables introduced by / that is unselectively bound.
Notice that even if / contains an indefinite, X might still be the empty set. Now let
us slightly redefine the ordering relation between possibilities as follows:
Definition 3 Given a Lewis/Stalnaker similarity relation w between worlds, we
define the similarity relation ;Xhw;gi between world-assignment pairs as follows:
hv; hi ;Xhw;gi hu; ki iffdef h; k  g, h "X¼ k "X , and v w u.
Here h "X denotes the restriction of h to X , and thus conveys that h "X¼ k "X iff
8x 2 X : hðxÞ ¼ kðxÞ. What this definition comes down to is a weakening of defi-
nition 1, because it now allows for a comparison between possibilities where the
assignments are not the same. In particular, if X ¼ ; it immediately holds that the
assignments are irrelevant for the ordering relation: hv; hi ;;hw;gi hu; ki iff v w u.
If one makes the assumption that one can only be married to one girl, this small,
but independently motivated, change already accounts for example (7a) above,
without making the assumption that indefinites are ambiguous. We redefine the
selection function as follows:
Definition 4 f ;Xhw;gið=/=gÞ ¼ fi 2 =/=g : :9j 2 =/=g : j <;Xhw;gi ig.
Now example (7a) is predicted to be true if represented such that X ¼ ; just in
case Alex is married to Sue (and only Sue) in the world(s) closest to the actual one
where Alex is married to a(ny) girl from his class.
But what should we do to account for counterfactual variants of weak donkey
sentences like (7b)? To account for weak readings of counterfactual donkey sen-
tences, we have to assume that there are possibilities closest to the actual world
where I have more than one dime in my pocket. What is required to account for
such cases is to lump together all of the possibilities where the difference in
assignment doesn’t matter, and say that only one of those assignments has to be
taken into account for the interpretation of the consequent. Let us first say that
hv; hi 	X hu; ki iff v ¼ u and h "X¼ k "X . Then we give the following general truth
conditions of conditionals:
Definition 5 / >X w is true in hw; gi iff 8hv; hi 2 f ;Xhw;gið=/=gÞ : 9hu; ki 2
f ;Xhw;gið=/=gÞ : hu; ki 	X hv; hi and hu; ki verifies w.
Notice that with this definition we can account for both strong and weak coun-
terfactual donkey sentences. A strong counterfactual donkey sentence like (5) will
be represented by 9x½Px >fxg Qx and its meaning will be equivalent with that of the
universal sentence 8x½Px > Qx just as in the original account proposed in Sect. 3.3.
A weak counterfactual donkey sentence like (7b), on the other hand, will be rep-
resented by a formula of the form 9x½Px >; Qx and is true even if in the closest
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counterfactual world(s) where I have more than one dime in my pocket, I throw only
one of them into the meter.
5.2 NPI-any revisited
As suggested above, I propose that NPI-any should be treated as a weak ‘counter-
factual’ donkey sentence. More in particular, the proposed (Montague-style) meaning
of NPI-any will be kPkQ9x½Px >; Qx. I will show in a moment that given our
interpretation of ‘>X ’, this formula gives rise to the same truth conditions as the more
standard 9x½Px ^ Qx if we make one more assumption: that a sentence in which any
with restrictor P occurs presupposes that P has a non-empty extension (in the world
of interpretation). Notice, first, that this assumption is quite innocent for uses of
U-any if these are analyzed as we proposed in Sect.4. In particular, it doesn’t exclude
at all that we take into account non-actual worlds to verify the sentence in which it
occurs. Given our analysis of weak counterfactual donkey sentences and our proposed
representation of NPI-any, on the other hand, this innocent looking presupposition
has the very welcome effect that 9x½Px >; Qx will have exactly the same truth
conditions as the formula 9x½Px ^ Qx, which is the standard translation of indefini-
tes.23 By K&L’s widening and strengthening analysis, this will thus have the effect
that we predict: that NPI-any is, indeed, licensed almost only in DE contexts.
Let me now show why 9x½Px >; Qx will have exactly the same truth conditions
as the formula 9x½Px ^ Qx, if P has a non-empty extension in the actual world. The
first thing to notice is that because the set of variables which NPI-any unselectively
quantifies over is empty, i.e. X ¼ ;, the ordering relation in terms of which our
formula 9x½Px >; Qx is interpreted comes down to the standard Lewis/Stalnaker
ordering between possible worlds. With Lewis and Stalnaker we have assumed that
this ordering satisfies strong centering, which means that for any two different
worlds v and w, w is always strictly more similar to itself than v is to w: w <w v.
Assuming that P has a non-empty extension in actual world w—i.e., assuming that
the presupposition is satisfied—it follows by definition 5 that to verify 9x½Px >; Qx
we only have to consider the actual world w. Take the possibility in which the
sentence is interpreted to be hw; gi.24 By definition 5 again, for 9x½Px >; Qx to be
true in hw; gi, it is enough if there is a h such that hw; hi 2 =9xPx=g and hw; hi
verifies Qx. But this means that there must be a d 2 D such that h ¼ g½x=d  (meaning
as usual that h is just like g except that it assigns variable x to individual d) and
hðxÞ 2 IwðP Þ and hðxÞ 2 IwðQÞ (where IwðP Þ denotes the extension of P in w
according to the model’s interpretation function I). But that obviously means that
9x½Px >; Qx has exactly the same truth conditions as the formula 9x½Px ^ Qx, if P
has a non-empty extension, which is precisely what we wanted to show.
Given this proof, we have shown that we can treat not only U-any as a ‘coun-
terfactual’ donkey sentence (in disguise), but NPI-any as well. The only difference
23 One might complain that in this way we can’t account for sentences like There isn’t any unicorn in
the garden. I don’t think this is a serious problem, because I find this sentence appropriate only in case it
is assumed (for the sake of argument) that there are unicorns.
24 But notice that the identity of the assignment is quite irrelevant.
Towards a uniform analysis of any 307
123
is that whereas U-any is interpreted as a strong donkey sentence, NPI-any is
interpreted as a weak donkey sentence. Exactly because of this, (i) U-any gets a
universal interpretation and NPI-any an existential one, and thus (ii) U-any is via
K&L’s analysis licensed only in positive contexts, while NPI-any is licensed
(almost) only in negative contexts.25
I conclude that an analysis of the different uses of any as ‘counterfactual’ donkey
sentences (in disguise) is quite successful because (i) it gives rise to (approximately)
the same meanings as the successful analyses of U-any (Dayal) and NPI-any
(K&L), but it allows us to treat them all in an (almost) uniform way, and reduce
their differences to an independently required distinction between different readings
of donkey sentences (strong versus weak).26
6 Free choice any
In the previous section we have accounted for ‘Universal’ and ‘NPI’-any in a
uniform way. We have not yet explained how the following free choice reading of
any should be accounted for:
(8) You may take any card.
The main challenge is, of course, to account for the universal reading of (8). Given
that U-any gives rise to a universal reading, but NPI-any does not, it seems rea-
sonable to think of (8) in terms of U-any. The problem is that in order to get the
universal reading, we have to scope the existential quantifier over the modality and
represent (8) as 9xCx >fxg May ðj; TxÞ. Although this representation gives us the
intuitively correct reading,27 I believe the price of this unusual scoping is too high.
If we want to give ‘may’ scope over the existential quantifier, however, and represent
25 Rooth (1987) observed that some quantified donkey sentences (e.g. ones with ‘every’) typically give
rise to strong readings, whereas others (e.g. ones with ‘no’ or ‘few’) typically give rise (only) to weak
readings. Is this a problem for the proposed analysis (as one reviewer wondered)? Well, we predict that
any in examples like ‘No/few officer(s) gave any member of a squad its orders’ should be analyzed as a
weak counterfactual donkey, because the item occurs in a DE context. I think this is in accordance with
intuition.
26 Our analysis predicts that the following comparatives with any are appropriate:
(i) Mary is taller than any man.
(ii) Any man is taller than Mary.
On Seuren’s (1973) analysis of comparatives, John is taller than Mary iff 9d½Tallðj; dÞ ^ :Tallðm; dÞ,
where d is a degree and ‘Tall’ a relation between individuals and degrees. On this analysis, any occurs in
a DE context in (i) and in a positive context in (ii). Applying K&L’s appropriateness condition, this
means that we have to represent (i) by a formula like 9d½Tallðm; dÞ ^ :ð9xMx >; Tallðx; dÞÞ, while
(ii) should be represented either by 9d½ð9xMx >fxg Tallðx; dÞÞ ^ :Tallðm; dÞ or by 9xMx >fxg ð9d
½Tallðx; dÞ ^ :Tallðm; dÞÞ. If we make the natural assumption that Tallness is monotone decreasing in
degrees (8x; d; d 0½ðTallðx; dÞ^ d 0 < dÞ ! Tallðx; d 0Þ) the latter two analyses are identical. Something
similar happens with von Stechow’s (1984) analysis of comparatives.
27 If we assume that the ordering between worlds required to analyze the conditional connective ‘>’ is
such that v <w u iff IðCÞðwÞ  IðCÞðvÞ  IðCÞðuÞ, we make the same predictions as the system proposed
by Menendez-Benito (2005), who makes use of universal quantification and an exclusiveness operator.
See Sect. 7 for more discussion.
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(8) by May ðj; 9xCx >fxg TxÞ, we don’t receive the correct interpretation. This sug-
gests that we should represent the any in (8) in terms of ‘>;’ instead of ‘>fxg’. Now
the problem is that on a standard analysis of the modal, we can’t derive the universal
reading.28 I will suggest that this is due to a wrong choice of interpretation of ‘may’ in
(8). I will show that if we analyze the permission performatively, as originally
proposed by Lewis (1970/1919) and Kamp (1979), but account for this performative
analysis in a new distributive way, we can derive the universal reading of (8) and can
explain why domain widening gives rise to a stronger reading.
According to the performative account, if the master commands John to do / by
saying ‘You must do /’, or allows John to do / by saying ‘You may do /’, it is
typically not yet the case that the proposition expressed by / is respectively a
superset of, or consistent with, John’s permissibility set, P, represented by a set of
possible worlds. However, the performative effect of the command/permission will
be such that in the new context what is commanded is a superset of, and what is
permitted is consistent with, the new permissibility set. Thus, in case the command
or permission is not used vacuously, the permissibility set, P0, of the new context
will be different from P, so that the obligation/permission sentence will be satisfied.
Our problem is to say how command and permission sentences govern the change
from the prior permissibility set, P, to the posterior one, P0.
Kamp (1979) proposed to solve this problem by assuming that the change from
prior to posterior permission set is governed by (what is now called) revision and
contraction. The idea is that we not only have a set of best, or ideal, worlds, but also
a global reprehensibility ordering that says which non-ideal worlds are better than
others. It is well known that such an analysis can account for the free choice effect
of permission sentences like ‘You may take an apple or a pear’, but only in case
taking apples and taking pears is equally reprehensible. Although this proposal is
very natural, it is not quite good enough to account for the free choice effect of ‘You
may take any apple’ (if ‘any’ is represented by an existential quantifier). On Kamp’s
performative analysis one can only conclude from this sentence that one is allowed
to take apple a iff apple a is among the least reprehensible ones to take. The free
choice effect seems to be stronger, though, and independent of a reprehensibility
ordering. Van Rooij (2006a) proposed to tackle this problem by assuming that the
change from prior to posterior permission state is sensitive to the assignments as
well. Here we will follow a recent suggestion by Schulz (2008) to account for the
update effect of permissions in terms of a local instead of a global ordering relation
between worlds. The local ordering relation is the standard one used in premise
semantics: given a set of formulas W, we define v to be at least as ‘good’ as w,
w W v, iff all formulas in W true in w are also true in v.
w W v iffdef 8w 2 W : w 
 w ) v 
 w
28 Quite a number of authors (e.g. Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Schulz 2005, Fox 2006) have proposed
to account for the ‘conjunctive’ implication of a sentence like ‘You may take an apple or a pear’ in terms
of conversational implicatures. Thus one might propose (e.g. Chierchia 2006; Aloni and van Rooij 2007)
to account for the universal reading of (8) by means of a conversational implicature as well. However,
conversational implicatures are cancelable, and the universal reading of (8) is not, which suggests (to me)
that the universal reading of this sentence should not be accounted for by a Gricean implicature after all.
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In terms of this ordering relation, we now define a function that assigns to a world
w and a formula / the /-worlds which are minimal extensions of w:
fðw;/Þ def¼¼ fv 2 ½½/ : w  v & :9u 2 ½½/ : w  u & u < vg
The idea is that if we previously were in allowed world w and are now allowed to
make / true, we are allowed to go to any /-worlds that are minimal extensions of w.
As in standard dynamic semantics, we assume that the (performative) effect of a
permission sentence is modeled as a function from prior to posterior permission set.
In fact, following Schulz (2008) we will make use of a partial semantics here. The
positive update function of a permission with respect to permission set P is defined
by means of this choice function given above:




Thus, the result of the permission is that new worlds are added to the prior
permission set. The negative update of the same sentence does the reverse: it
eliminates /-worlds from the permission set.




This definition of the positive and negative update functions wouldn’t be com-
plete without a recursive definition of the meaning of the sentential connectives.
This recursive definition is given below:
P½:/þ def¼¼ P½/
 P½:/ def¼¼ P½/
þ
P½/ ^ wþ def¼¼ P½/
þ½wþ P½/ ^ w def¼¼ P½/
 [P½w
If we now define ‘_’ in terms of ‘:’ and ‘^’ as usual, and also define the update
with ‘Must’ in terms of the update with ‘May’ in the standard way:
P½Must /þ def¼¼ P½: May :/
þ P½Must / def¼¼ P½: May :/
;
we receive the appealing result that P½Must /þ ¼ P \ ½½/.
To account for entailments between permission sentences, Kamp (1979) pro-
posed the notion of p-entailment. It says that ‘May w’ follows from ‘May /’
(Mayðj;/Þ 
p Mayðj;wÞ) iff adding the permission that w doesn’t change the per-
mission set anymore after you were permitted to do /. On our new dynamic analysis,
this means that the permission of w follows from the permission of / iffdef for all
permission states, P : P½/þ ¼ P½/þ½wþ. Notice that in case QðaÞ and QðbÞ are
elements of the set W in terms of which the ordering relation is defined, it follows that
May ðj;QðaÞ _ QðbÞÞ 
d May ðj;QðaÞÞ ^May ðj;QðbÞÞ. If it is also the case that
QðcÞ is an element of W, May ðj;QðcÞÞ doesn’t follow from May ðj;QðaÞ _ QðbÞÞ.
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However, May ðj;QðcÞÞ does follow from May ðj;QðaÞ _ QðbÞ _ QðcÞÞ. This is
crucial for us to account for the universal ‘reading’ of (8).
We have seen above that on our suggested representation of (8) by
Mayðj; 9xPx >; QxÞ, the embedded clause of (8) is truth-conditionally equivalent
with 9xPx ^ Qx for worlds in P that satisfy the presupposition that predicate P has a
non-empty extension. Thinking of this existential sentence as a (large) disjunction,
and making use of the above reasoning, we have accounted for the free choice effect
of (8). Moreover, on our analysis it follows that the permission to take a(ny) card is
strengthened if one extends the domain: Mayðj; 9xDPxÞ 
p Mayðj; 9xD0PxÞ if
D  D0. This means that on Kadmon and Landman’s analysis of any, we have
explained why this item is licensed in permission sentences.
Dayal forcefully argued that any analysis of any has to account for the contrast
between the acceptability of (8) versus the unacceptability of (9):
(9) *You must take any card.
On our proposed analysis this follows immediately on the obvious extension of
Kamp’s notion of p-entailment to commands: Mustðj;/Þ 
p Mustðj;wÞ iff adding the
obligation that w doesn’t change the permission set anymore after you were obliged to
do /.29 To see that this follows, notice that the update of P with Mustðj; 9DQxÞ, i.e.
P \ ½½9DQx, doesn’t have to entail the following formula, 9D0Qx, where D0  D. For
if D ¼ fa; b; cg, and the worlds in P where John takes cards a, b, and c arew1, w2, and
w3, respectively, P \ ½½9DQx will be fw1;w2;w3g, while P \ ½½9D0Qx, with
D0 ¼ fa; bg  fa; b; cg ¼ D, will be fw1;w2g. Thus, after the obligation of 9xDQx the
permission set will still change when you get the obligation that 9xD0Qx. But this
means that domain extension does not result in a stronger obligation, which means
that K&L’s constraint for the appropriate use of any is not met.30
7 Comparison and conclusion
Negative polarity and free choice items are hotly debated in the literature. But apart
from the papers of Dayal and K&L (and Krifka), I haven’t made much reference to
this discussion in this paper. Although it is impossible to do justice to all proposed
analyses, in this final section I will briefly relate my analysis to at least some
other analyses not discussed so far, and lay out some possible modifications and
extensions.
29 Kamp’s notion of p-entailment and this extension are both special cases of Veltman’s (1996) more
general entailment relation between speech acts.
30 As noted by Giannikidou (2001), among others, in direct commands, any can be used appropriately:
(i) Take any card.
Intuitively, (i) means ‘You must take a card, it doesn’t matter which.’ If we would analyze (9) and (i) in
the same way, we wouldn’t be able to account for the contrast, obviously. I would suggest that (9) is
inappropriate but (i) is not because only the latter expresses a command and permission at the same time;
the former expresses (or wants to express) just a command.
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A prominent analysis of crosslinguistic (variants of) any is proposed in various
papers of Anastasia Giannakidou. Like us, she argues for an existential analysis of
any, but seeks to account for its appropriateness in terms of licensing conditions in
the style of Ladusaw (1979). In Giannakidou (2001), for instance, it is claimed that
NPI-any is licensed in non-veridical contexts, while FC-any (including our U-any)
also demands that the context be episodic. Giannakidou argues against Ladusaw’s
analysis with an impressive battery of counterexamples, but at least some of these
counterexamples can be accounted for by other approaches that distinguish between
the several potential meanings of any (like K&L and Dayal). I won’t discuss these
examples here, but just want to note that Giannnakidou as well makes use of a
(strict) conditional to account for U-any, following Legrand (1975). Indeed, one can
account for the intuition that U-any is stronger than every by treating it in terms of a
strict conditional that quantifies over worlds. However, it doesn’t seem to be pos-
sible—in contrast to our analysis in terms of counterfactual connective ‘>’—to give
a similar treatment of NPI-any in terms of strict conditionals such that this
item gives rise to its standard existential meaning.31 In this sense, Legrand’s and
Giannakidou’s analyses of any will end up being less uniform than ours.
A semantically uniform analysis of both uses of any has been proposed by
Chierchia (2006), modified by Aloni and van Rooij (2007).32 Chierchia follows
K&L in their analysis of any as an ordinary indefinite, with reliance on the ‘wid-
ening-leads-to-strengthening’ condition, but seeks to account for U-any by con-
versational implicature rather than by appealing to genericity. Thinking of an
existential sentence as a large disjunction, Chierchia (2006) proposes that ‘A _ B’
gives rise to the conversational implicature that the speaker doesn’t know that
‘A ^ :B’ is true and doesn’t know that ‘:A ^ B’ is true. By assuming that the
speaker knows what he is talking about, we can conversationally implicate that the
speaker knows that both conjunctions are false, and thus that ‘A ^ :B’ and ‘:A ^ B’
are both false. But in conjunction with the assertion this means that it has to be the
case that ‘A ^ B’ is true. Although appealing, I believe (on second thought) that such
an approach is problematic, for two reasons. First of all, it does not really account
for the ‘that-can’t-be-an-accident’ force of the universal reading. Second, it assumes
that the relevant conversational implicatures are uncancelable, which goes against
the very idea of something being an implicature in the first place. Most naturally,
what can be cancelled is the assumption that the speaker is knowledgeable: the step
from ‘not know A’ to ‘know not A’. Applying cancelability to Chierchia’s rea-
soning, however, would make the wrong prediction: it is predicted that the U-any
sentence can be true, although at the same time the speaker doesn’t know that the
universal statement is true. So, with Jayez and Tovena (2005), I would argue against
an analysis that accounts for the universal force of U-any in terms of a conversa-
tional implicature.
Where Chierchia wants to derive the strong reading of U-any by making strong
knowledge assumptions, Javez and Tovena (2005) and others would rather like to
infer universality from one’s lack of knowledge, or from one’s indifference. In
31 That is, without making strong ad hoc assumptions.
32 For a related approach, see Abrusan (2006).
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fact, this assumption is not very different from Dayal’s (1998) vagueness
requirement. Dayal argues that ‘John talked to any of these women’ is bad because
in order for the speaker to know that the sentence is true, the speaker has to know of
each of the individual women he is looking at that John talked to her. But this
requirement violates Dayal’s vagueness constraint on the quantificational domain of
U-any that the speaker should not know (or care about, we might add) exactly
(roughly speaking) who he was talking about. Part of this irrelevance or lack of
knowledge requirement we have already accounted for by our ‘counterfactual’
analysis: to see whether a sentence of the form ‘9x½Px >fxg Qx’ is true we can’t
limit ourselves to the individuals who actually have property P . In fact, given
that Dayal’s treatment of whatever (Dayal 1997) is so close to her analysis of
FC-any—and because of Legrand’s (1975) claim that free relatives combined with
wh-ever are semantically equivalent to any combined with a relative clause—it
looks attractive to account for the universal reading of sentences like ‘John voted for
whoever was on top of the ballot’ in terms of a ‘counterfactual’ donkey analysis as
well.33 Another part we have not accounted for yet: that the speaker doesn’t know,
or care about, which individuals actually have property P . I don’t see any harm
being done if we add this constraint as a presupposition for the use of universal
(or perhaps of any?) uses of any.
Two final papers I would like to mention are Menenez-Benito (2005) and Aloni
(2006). Both assume that occurrences of free choice any (or their Spanish and
Italian counterparts) should be interpreted as indeterminate pronouns along the
lines of Kratzer and Shimoyama’s (2002) analysis of German existential free choice
items. According to their proposals, the free choice item introduces a set of
(Hamblian) alternative propositions, and the universal interpretation is guaranteed
by assuming that at top level we universally quantify over the alternative propo-
sitions. Interestingly, they explain why any is appropriate under may but not under
must by assuming that the propositional alternatives are mapped into a set of
mutually exclusive propositions because of an exclusiveness (Menendez-Benito
2005) or an exhaustivity operator (Aloni 2006). This exclusiveness is consistent
with the existential meaning of may, but not with the universal meaning of must.
Although neither of these approaches can really account for the ‘that-can’t-be-an-
accident’ force of U-any, I think they give rise to empirical predictions very similar
to my approach. However, I would like to claim that my proposal depends on
(arguably) less controversial assumptions: in contrast to them, I don’t need a
Hamblin-style semantics for indefinites, propositional alternatives, or a covert
universal quantification over propositional alternatives. Most of all, however,
their assumption that we need a covert exclusiveness or exhaustivity operator to
account for free choice permissions like (8) is not needed, because exclusiveness
follows from my treatment: we are looking for minimally different worlds
(from a world, or set of worlds, where no card is taken). If (8) is analyzed in terms
of U-any –9xCx >fxg May Tx– exclusiveness is due to the meaning of the
33 Though following observations of Jacobson (1995) and others, we should perhaps allow the variable to
range over pluralities now. This would also account for Choi’s observation (p.c.) that you may take more
than one thing after the permission ‘You may take whatever is given to you.’
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counterfactual connective; if (8) is analyzed in terms of NPI-any and a performative
analysis, exclusiveness follows from a minimal change of the permission set.
In this paper I have limited myself to the use of the English item any. This is
probably still the most discussed word in any discussion of negative polarity and/or
free choice items. However, more recently people have become very interested in
the issue how negative polarity and free choice items are expressed in languages
other than English, and discovered that there exists large variability (see Choi 2007
and Vlachou 2007 for two extensive recent studies). I would have liked to explore
what my analysis of any might have to offer on the issue of language variability, but
I’m afraid I am not competent enough on these matters to enter into such discussions
and leave that to others. I will also leave to others the proposal to take the two any’s
to be even more look-alike than what is proposed in this paper, by assuming that
semantically speaking all donkey sentences have only weak truth conditions, and
accounting for the strong readings in terms of pragmatics.
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